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Book Review
Developing a world tax organization:
The way forward
by Adrian J. Sawyer*
Neil Brooks**
1 The Need for International Tax Cooperation
The current financial and economic crisis has underlined the interrelatedness of the
world's economies and the importance of coordinating the use of each individual
country's governing policy instruments, including taxation.' The G20 London
Summit in April 2009 that dealt generally with issues raised by the crisis called in
particular for more concerted action in preventing international tax evasion and
in assisting developing countries in securing the benefits of a more cooperative tax
* Adrian J. Sawyer, Developing a World Tax Organization (Birmingham: Fiscal Publications, 2009).
** Neil Brooks teaches tax law and policy at Osgoode Hall Law School and is a Senior Fellow of the
Taxation Law and Policy Institute, Monash Univeristy.
1 The executive summary of a report recently released by the Fiscal Affairs Department of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) begins by noting, "tax distortions are likely to have
encouraged excessive leverage and other financial market problems evident in the crisis" IMF,
'Debt Bias and Other Distortions: Crisis-Related Issues in Tax Policy' 12 June 2009. Many of the
tax policy concerns discussed in the paper that might have contributed to the seriousness of the
financial crisis could only be dealt with realistically through international cooperation.
This paper was accepted for publication on 16 August 2008.
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environment.2 Following that communique, both the European Commission 3 and
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development4 issued statements
outlining the work they have been undertaking to counter international tax evasion
and to reduce unfair tax competition. They both also suggested future directions
for more international cooperation and coordination of tax policies, now generally
referred to compendiously as good governance in the tax area.
The need for increased coordination and harmonization of tax policies has, of
course, long been recognized by all those who appreciate the arbitrariness of national
boundaries and the social construction of markets, and who care about the importance
of citizens being able to take collective action through democratically elected public
institutions. Initially, beginning in the 1920s, international tax coordination involved,
by and large, countries entering into bilateral agreements in order to prevent the double
taxation of transnational flows of income. The primary concern was the promotion
of international trade and investment. However, more recently, international tax
coordination of tax policies has involved efforts to mitigate the full range of ways that
one country's tax system might affect or constrain public policies in other countries
and, in particular, it has involved measures to reduce international tax evasion and
unfair tax competition. A large number of international organizations have been
involved in these efforts including the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations
(UN), the European Union (EU), and various groupings of national tax departments.5
2 G20, 'Global plan for recovery and reform: the Communique from the London Summit' 2 April
2009. The G20 leaders agreed "to take action against non-cooperative jurisdictions, including tax
havens." They also stated that "We stand ready to deploy sanctions to protect our public finances
and financial systems. The era of banking secrecy is over. We note that the OECD has today
published a list of countries assessed by the Global Forum against the international standard for
exchange of tax information ...", http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/en/summit-aims/summit-
communique.
3 Commission of the European Communities, Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters, Com
(2009) 201 Final, Brussels, 28 April 2009 ("With the current financial and economic crisis,
national budgets and tax systems are under increased threat and the need for international tax
cooperation and common standards (i.e. 'good governance in the tax area') has become a regular
feature of international discussions"). The Commission noted that good governance in the tax
area included more transparency, the exchange of information, and fair tax competition.
4 OECD, Overview of the OECD's Work on Countering International Tax Evasion, A Background
Information Brief, 13 July 2009 ("Since the beginning of 2009, international tax evasion and the
implementation of the internationally agreed tax standard has been very high on the political
agenda, reflecting recent scandals that have affected countries around the world, the spotlight
that the global financial crises has put on financial centres generally, and the recent G20 London
Summit.").
5 A particularly comprehensive list of all international forums that are now involved in aspects of
international tax cooperation is provided in United Nations, Secretary-General, Financing for
Development: A Critical Global Collaboration, Documents presented by the Secretary-General
to the Preparatory Committee of the International Conference on Financing for Development
Monterrey, Mexico, March 18-22, 2002, Technical Note No. 1.
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2 Sawyer's Case for a World Tax Organization
Over the past decade, a number of commentators have suggested that the problems
of international tax coordination have become so urgent that some form of world
tax organization should be formed in order to discharge explicitly this coordination
function. Adrian Sawyer's important new book, Developing a World Tax Organization:
The Way Forward, is the first full-length book treatment of the issue. The book is
exhaustively researched, logically structured, and clearly and persuasively written. It
makes an important original contribution to our knowledge in this subject area and,
at the same time, provides a comprehensive literature review of the issues and thus
establishes a solid foundation for further research and debate.
Adrian Sawyer is a Professor of taxation in the Department of Accounting and
Information Systems at the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand.
He is a prolific author. His published articles range over most aspects of tax law
but in particular he has made major contributions to knowledge in the areas of tax
administration and compliance, the taxation of electronic commerce, and aspects
of international taxation. For the past nine years he has also been the lead editor
of the highly regarded New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law & Policy. He has won
several awards for his teaching and scholarship including the inaugural Cedric
Sandford Medal for the best paper presented at the ATAX biennial International
Tax Administration Conference in 2004 for a paper that covered some of the subject
matter of this book.
The book is based in part on his doctoral dissertation, which was completed at the
University of Virginia's School of Law and defended in November 2006. Most of the
chapters have been previously published in tax journals in some form; however, they
have been substantially edited and are coherently presented to advance the central
claim of the book: that a world tax organization is needed and feasible.
In addition to restating the general case for a world tax organization, and exploring
the present context for it in some detail, the book's main original contribution to the
debate over a world tax organization is its suggestion that the initial jurisdiction of
the organization should be to assist only in the administration of advanced rulings
involving cross-border business transactions and advance pricing agreements and
that, with experience, its jurisdiction should then be incrementally expanded to
cover other tax areas where international coordination and cooperation is needed.
The advantage, Sawyer argues, of starting relatively modestly with the coordination
of the administrative practices of member nations as they relate to binding rules
and advance pricing agreements is that this will allow participants to test the value
of such an organization. If the organization is successful, he suggests issues such as
e-commerce and environmental tax policy, the allocation of the corporate tax base,
harmful tax competition, and even attempting to reach a consensus on core tax
principles are obvious issues the organization might examine over time. The book also
makes an important original contribution by providing considerable detail relating to
the possible structure of such a world tax organization.
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The book's central claim is developed in the following manner. In chapter 2
the context for thinking about the need for coordinating national tax systems - in
a word, globalization (driven not only by technological changes but also by policy
liberalization) - and much of the rich literature exploring the meaning, causes
and consequences of globalization, are thoroughly reviewed. Most importantly,
globalization has provided more freedom for firms to decide where to locate their
production facilities; more possibilities for businesses to be efficiently operated as vast
networks of complex inter-related entities spread across the globe; more freedom for
multinationals to shed their distinct national identities; more prospects for highly
skilled individuals to deliver their services and enjoy the amenities of modern life
from almost anywhere in the world; and, more opportunities for corporations and
high-income individuals to hide their income from capital from the prying eyes of
tax departments.
Taking advantage of these new opportunities, a number of countries have been
willing to restructure their tax systems to engage in begger-thy-neighbour policies
to attract footloose resources. This has placed pressures on governments around the
world to lower tax rates and to shift taxes from corporate income and the income of
high-income individuals to relatively immobile tax bases such as sales and payroll
taxes. There is huge debate over the extent of globalization, the effect it has had on tax
systems, and whether these effects are normatively a good thing. Tax-related concepts
of cooperation, coordination, harmonization and competition have been used to
describe the possible reactions to these developments. In addition to reviewing the
literature on all aspects of globalization, chapter 2 and the first part of chapter 3 define
these concepts and explain their relevance to the debate over a world tax organization.
Suggestions for a world tax organization have been put forward by a number of
tax analysts over the past decade including proposals by Vito Tanzi, Reuven Avi-
Yonah, Victor Thuronyi, Dale Pinto, and Jack Mintz. This extensive literature is
thoroughly reviewed in chapter 3. Others have argued that instead of a new stand-
alone organization, the jurisdiction and reach of existing international forums might
be expanded to embrace new areas for tax cooperation. Individual scholars writing
in this area have argued that one or the other of the existing major organizations
would be most suitable for assuming increased responsibilities for coordination and
cooperation, most notably, either the OECD ( supported by Cockfield and Brauner,
for example), the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Avi-Yonah), the UN (Horner
and McIntyre). Sawyer describes in considerable detail the structure, scope and work
methods of each of these, and other, major organizations and reviews the case made
for and against each in the literature. In particular, in support of his case for a world
tax organization, he notes the shortcomings of each in assuming an expanded role.
The OECD is the most obvious candidate for assuming additional responsibilities
since it has a long history of involvement in collecting tax statistics and analyzing
international tax issues, has accumulated an impressive amount of expertise in
international tax policy, and has experienced considerable success in coordinating
international tax cooperation through its work on its model double taxation treaty
and transfer pricing guidelines, the taxation of electronic commerce, and unfair tax
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competition. Moreover, it is the organization that is undoubtedly responsible for
the fact that there is such wide international similarity in the outlines of the present
international tax regimes in individual countries. However, since it is comprised of
only thirty of the world's largest economies, it is not seen as representative enough
to assume the rule of a world tax organization by many commentators, including
Sawyer. It is frequently disparagingly referred to in this literature as the rich
countries club and although particularly in recent years it has undertaken several
outreach programs involving other countries and attempted to make its work more
inclusive and transparent it is widely criticized as not giving low-income countries a
meaningful enough role so that they could be regarded as legitimate partners. Other
concerns about increasing the role of the OECD include that it is too influenced by
large contributors like the United States; has proved too vulnerable to prevailing neo-
liberal political ideologies; and, is too insensitive to the development agenda. Also,
although those who support the soft law approach to international tax coordination
see this as its strength, it is primarily concerned with the diffusion of information and
the discussion of technical issues and does not have any decision-making power or
binding authority to back up its decisions. Sawyer is primarily concerned with its lack
of representation, lack of enforceable decision-making power, and lack of experience
with binding dispute resolution procedures.
The WTO is another possible international organization that could assume the
role of a world tax organization. The role of the WTO is, of course, to supervise and
liberalize international trade by providing a framework for negotiating and formalizing
trade agreements and to provide a dispute resolution forum for enforcing adherence
to WTO trade agreements. Although it focuses exclusively on trade issues, application
of the nondiscrimination and non-subsidisation of exports principles, which underlie
many trade disputes, mean that trade and international tax issues are often closely
related. Indeed, a good many of the disputes resolved by the WTO involve tax-related
issues. Moreover, the WTO is much more representative than the OECD. It has 153
members, including most low-income countries, and most of the remaining nations
in the world are seeking membership. It obviously has considerable experience with
enforcing binding dispute resolutions. Sawyer suggests that the problems with the
WTO assuming the role of a world tax organization include that it has no existing
expertise in the wide range of international tax issues; it has a tarnished history as an
acceptable international rule maker; its relatively non-transparent procedures have
frequently called into question its democratic legitimacy; there might be conflicts
between providing it with both a trade and tax jurisdiction and the pursuit of the
goals in one subject area might detract from the pursuit of the goals of the other;
and, finally, in some areas of international tax coordination what are called for is not
legalistic but soft law approaches with which the WTO has no experience.
The final major international organization that might assume the role of a world tax
organization is the UN. Its membership includes almost all recognized governments
in the world; its stated purposes include cooperation in international law; and one
of its six major organs, The Economic and Social Council, is mandated to assist with
promoting international economic and social cooperation and development. Its
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structure could easily accommodate an institution like a world tax organization and
its various bodies at present deal with the full range of governance issues and dispute
resolution. Its tax policy body, now designated as the Committee of Experts on
International Cooperation in Tax Matters, has prepared a model tax treaty analogous
to that of the OECD's and its mandate from the Economic and Social Council
includes the full range of issues relating to international tax cooperation. 6 However,
over the years the U.N. has devoted only a modest amount of attention and resources
to international tax issues. Certainly nothing compared to that of the OECD. In spite
of its obvious strengths, Sawyer is somewhat dismissive of the possibility of the U.N.
assuming the role of a world tax organization: "A major shortcoming is the relatively
little experience the UN and its associated organizations have with taxation policy
and practice - indeed the focus of the UN's operations is more akin to individuals'
rights, protection and security, than for facilitating international business." (p. 78-79)
In the latter part of chapter 3 and in chapter 8, Sawyer elaborates on the possible
design and structure of a stand-alone world tax organization. He reviews how it
might be funded, the form of its constitutional documents, its membership, and the
range of functions it might assume. He even offers a possible detailed diagrammatic
organizational structure. Much ofthis discussion builds on suggestions offered in earlier
articles by Vito Tanzi and Victor Thuronyi, for example, but Sawyer's contribution to
the possible design of a world trade organization is more comprehensive and detailed.
In support of his case that the initial jurisdiction of a world tax organization
should be limited to binding rulings with cross border implications and advance
pricing agreements, chapters 4, 5 and 6 provide a thorough review of the purposes,
the administrative details, and a comparative analysis of these two administrative
practices. Chapter 7 provides an explanation of how these two practices would benefit
from enhanced international cooperation and particularized suggestions for how the
administrative apparatus of an international tax organization might be structured to
coordinate them and resolve disputes in relation to them.
The final chapter provides a summary of his arguments and suggestions for future
research. Sawyer notes that much work remains to be done in thinking about the role
of the world tax organization and hopes others will continue to advance the agenda.
In that spirit, in the remaining part of this review I offer a few thoughts about the
need for international tax coordination and cooperation and the most efficacious
way it might be achieved. To reveal my theoretical hand, I think the tax system as a
governing policy instrument is important for two reasons primarily, to raise revenue
and to assist in achieving a socially acceptable distribution of income. Like Sawyer, I
strongly believe that these purposes of the tax system will not be sustainable without
considerable more international cooperation. However, unlike Sawyer, I do not
believe that some form of world tax organization is either feasible or necessary, but
that instead existing international organizations ought to be encouraged to redouble
their efforts to foster international tax cooperation and in particular the UN should
undertake a substantially increased role in this area.
6 U.N. website, available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/mandate.htm
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A central claim in the book, repeated in numerous contexts and from different
angles, is that the initial jurisdiction of a world tax organization should be modest,
in part in order to assist in getting agreement on its formation, and then as the
organization learns from experience and experimentation, it should proceed to expand
its jurisdiction to other areas of international tax coordination and cooperation.
On the broader question of how much international coordination is necessary, it is
unclear how far Sawyer would go. In numerous places he states that harmonization
is undesirable, but he does liken his approach to the "camel's nose under the tent
approach" (p. 207) In a subsequent article with a frequent co-author, Dale Pinto,
ominously entitled "Towards Sustaining the Future of Taxation" and subtitled "Is a
World Tax organization necessary and feasible in today's globalized world?" Sawyer
and Pinto argue that "the future of the administration of most 'international' tax
systems is not sustainable in the current environment of limited cooperation"'7 They
conclude that "for the future of 'international' tax systems, as we know them to be,
to be sustainable in terms of producing sufficient revenue for governments' needs
and for an equitable distribution of the imposition of taxes, then a WTO [world tax
organization] is a necessary requirement."
3 Necessary Coordinating Tasks and the Allocation of
Responsibilities
In thinking about how best to advance the agenda for international tax cooperation
and coordination, it is helpful to review why such coordination is so important. This
is familiar stuff but it puts in context what existing organizations are doing and the
potential role for a world tax organization. The basic point I would make is simply to
express some reservations about whether on the truly important areas where there
is a need for coordination, it is worth spending much time pushing for a world tax
organization. Instead, existing organizations should be encouraged to assume enlarged
roles and in particular the U.N. should assume a much greater role in international
tax coordination and harmonization.
The various reasons why international tax coordination and cooperation are
important might be, and frequently are, classified under headings such as the
following: to improve the rationality and to increase the similarities of domestic tax
laws, by encouraging countries to learn from one another; to reduce the compliance
costs of cross border transactions, in order to foster increased trade and investment;
to reduce the double tax of cross border transactions, in order to foster increased trade
and investment and in the interest of fairness; to reduce international tax avoidance,
in order to ensure that all income is taxed at least once; to prevent international tax
evasion, so that countries can realistically enforce their domestic tax rules; and, to
7 Dale Pinto and Adrian Sawyer, 'Towards Sustaining the Future of Taxation: Is a World Tax
Organization Necessary and Feasible in Today's Globalised World?' (2009) 24 Australian Tax
Forum 179, 203.
8 Ibid at 205.
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prevent tax competition, so that all countries are able to retain some autonomy in
designing their own tax systems. Each objective, and the present efforts to achieve it,
will be briefly noted in turn.
3.1 Fostering Mutual Learning
If countries are to learn from one another, and improve their own tax systems, there
are a range of tasks that must be undertaken. Fiscal policies around the world must
be monitored, statistics collected, and trends and relationships analyzed; country
experiences with particular tax developments must be compared and evaluated
and best practices identified; and, a forum must be provided for the exchange of
information and ideas to promote learning.
All of the major organizations involved in tax cooperation are doing this type of
work. Most notably, the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs now does this in a big
way: it collects statistics, it does comparative studies, and it evaluates the tax systems
in individual countries of the OECD and provides advice in annual country reports.
Since these aspects of its work are such an integral part of its larger economic objectives,
it is hard to imagine it would give up this work to a world tax organization. Also, to
be frank, the OECD has developed such expertise and experience in this area (at least
as applied to its members) that is also hard to imagine this work could be any better
done. The IMF also has a relatively large staff of tax experts, including economists and
lawyers, who produce general country reports, publish a large number of working
papers relating to tax, and provide specific technical tax advice including drafting
tax statutes for individual countries and advising on the design and operation of tax
administrations. The World Bank has similarly developed considerable expertise in
tax matters, in particular in tax administration, and assists low-income countries
around the world with problems of tax administration. Again, in part because this
tax work relates relatively directly to their wider monitoring of world economic and
social trends, and the other economic and social assistance they provide countries,
it is unlikely these organizations would willingly relinquish these important roles
in comparative tax law and administration. Also, their expertise is unquestionable.
The OECD's comparative tax work is relied upon by tax administrations around the
world, the IMF's tax analysts have made major contributions to tax and public finance
scholarship, and the World Bank's work on tax administration is unrivalled in its
sophistication.
In part as a follow-up to the recommendations made at the First International
Conference on Financing for Development (organized by the UN and held in
Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002), which pushed for improvements in international
tax cooperation, the OECD, IMF, World Bank, along with the UN, joined together in
the International Tax Dialogue (ITD). The primary purpose of the ITD is to facilitate
the discussion of tax matters, the sharing of experiences, and the identification of
best practices. It maintains a widely accessible, and increasingly complete, database
of official and other documents relating to tax policy and administration, has held
numerous conferences, and generally has brought together international organizations,
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ministries of finance, and tax administrators, in ways that have contributed both to
the dissemination of knowledge on best practices and to greater public transparency
to international tax issues. With all of these international organizations contributing
to the study of individual tax systems and the dissemination of tax knowledge a new
organization is not needed to serve these purposes. Moreover, there is some value in
having more than one organization collecting data and approaching the comparative
study of tax law from different perspectives.
3.2 Reducing Cross-Border Transaction Costs
A second reason for coordinating international tax law is to facilitate globalization
by reducing the transaction costs of cross-border transactions by increasing their
simplicity and certainty. This is the objective Sawyer urges a world tax organization
to concern itself with, initially. He argues that the negotiation, imposition, and
enforcement of cross-border binding rules and advance pricing agreements, and
the resolution of disputes arising out of them, would be greatly facilitated if there
were a world tax organization. I am skeptical of the need for a world tax organization
for this purpose. Despite gaining considerable scholarly attention, advance pricing
agreements are not utilized nearly as often as anticipated. Moreover, when they
are used, gaining cooperation between the various revenue agencies involved
in the administration of particular agreements would appear to be a relatively
straightforward exercise and not one that these individual agencies would be willing
to delegate to a world tax organization. Although Sawyer's basic point is that dealing
with this issue should only be the relatively noncontroversial initial jurisdiction for a
world tax organization, making a strong case for a world tax organization expressly
for this purpose is one of the underdeveloped parts of his book. In any event, it does
seem to be the least important reason for increased international cooperation and
if countries were to truly increase their cooperation in taxing multinationals and
adopt some form of combined reporting with formulary apportionment (see below)
it would be unnecessary.
3.3 Preventing Double Taxation
Initially, as international trade and investment increased, and beginning in the 1920s
under the leadership of the League of Nations, the primary goal of international tax
policy coordination was to prevent the double taxation of cross-border transactions
and in particular to resolve the overlapping jurisdiction to tax of resident and source
countries. Eventually, the task of providing guidance on this issue was taken up by the
OECD and the UN in the preparation of their respective model bilateral income tax
treaties. Bilateral treaties based on these models now cover the globe and as a macro
issue the potential for double taxation would no longer appear to be a major matter of
concern. Some commentators have suggested that substantial gains could be made by
moving from bilateral to multilateral treaties including the greater ease of extending
the coverage of treaties, of keeping them under continuous review, and of updating
them as new problems arise and policies change. Multilateral treaties would also
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provide more consistent interpretation and application of the key concepts underlying
international tax and a more accessible conflict resolution system. Finally, they can
deal more efficiently with issues involving more than two countries and the problem
of treaty shopping. One of the most consistent champions of multilateral treaties,
Victor Thuronyi, has argued that a world tax organization should be established to
draft, interpret and resolve dispute relating to a world-wide multilateral treaty9 and
Sawyer reviews and draws considerably on his work. But multilateral treaties have
been and are likely to continue to be most successful when done on a regional basis
and in any event the drafting and coordination of a multilateral treaty could be easily
accommodated within the framework of the OECD or the UN.
3.4 Ensuring Single Taxation
When tax systems differ, and in particular when they give inconsistent treatment to
the same legal arrangement, it is easy for taxpayers to engage in international tax
avoidance. To take the most straightforward examples, if a payment made between
countries pursuant to a financial instrument is treated as deductible interest in the
payer's country but as an exempt dividend in the payee's country the payment will not
be taxed even though if it were made solely between taxpayers within either country
it would have been. Similarly, if a transfer of an income generating asset between
persons in different countries is treated as a lease in the transferor's country and a
sale in the transferee's country both taxpayers might be able to claim a depreciation
allowance for the same asset in their respective countries. These types of cross-border
arbitrage opportunities are the stuff of a good deal of international tax planning.
Individual countries can try to stop these arbitrage opportunities, but more equitable
and neutral solutions usually involve international cooperation.
At present, in addition to the major international organizations mentioned above,
a large number of groupings of tax administrators from different countries exchange
information and attempt to deal with issues of international tax avoidance: the Seven
Country Working Group, the Joint International Tax Shelter Information Center, the
Pacific Association of Tax Administrators, which evolved into the Leeds Castle Group,
are only a few. Since international tax avoidance schemes are likely to be detected in
the first instance by tax administrators working in individual countries, and there
is likely some value in the informal pursuit of these schemes with other similarly
affected tax administrations, it is not clear that a world tax organization would add
much value to the project of preventing this type of tax avoidance.
Other strategies for reducing the opportunities for international tax avoidance have
been taken up by a number of organizations. For example, the Tax Justice Network and
other NGOs are pressuring the International Accounting Standard Board to require
multinationals to adopt an international accounting standard for country-by-country
reporting. Multinationals release their financial statements on a consolidated basis.
This allows them to obscure where their profits are reported for tax purposes and
9 Victor Thuronyi, 'International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral Tax Treaty' (2001) 26
Brooklyn Journal ofInternational Law 1641 (2001).
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the amount of taxes they pay in individual countries. Country-by-country reporting
would require multinationals to report how much of their gross income was earned
in each individual country, the particular expenses, including finances expenses that
they claimed against that income, profits before taxes, deferred taxes payable, and
taxes paid in each country. Thus, at the very least, it would make their tax avoidance
activities (and corrupt practices) much more transparent. Following the revelations
that many multinational oil and banking corporations had been complicit in the
plundering of state assets in some low-income but natural resource-rich, countries,
a coalition of NGOs embarked on a campaign called "Publish What you Pay:" The
campaign aims to require natural resource companies to disclose all of their payments
to government in every country in which they operate. Finally, the OECD and the UN
have both been working on codes of corporate conduct that would make taxpaying,
and avoiding aggressive tax avoidance schemes, an important part of corporate social
responsibility. This work would presumably continue to take place outside a world tax
organization and there is some danger it would be co-opted and less effectively dealt
with by one organization.
3.5 Minimizing Opportunities for Tax Evasion
One of the most urgent reasons for international tax cooperation is to reduce tax
evasion. The most effective, indeed indispensable, method for increasing tax
compliance domestically is a comprehensive information reporting system. In
every country with an income tax, third-party payers, such as employers, banks,
and dividend-paying corporations, are required to furnish the tax department with
returns that contain information about income payments they have made to resident
taxpayers. In this way tax departments can match information about the financial
transactions taxpayers have engaged in with the information they report on their
tax returns. It would seem obvious that if this system of information reporting is
essential for ensuring the reporting of income received from domestic payers it would
be even more important that it applies to international payers. But, requiring a bank,
for example, in a foreign country to provide information about any payments made
to a domestic taxpayer requires international cooperation. Countries in which a
taxpayer is resident do not have jurisdiction to require payers in foreign countries to
file information returns.
There have been many attempts to increase information sharing about income
payments across borders. All tax treaties contain an article dealing with information
exchanges between the signatory countries and even jurisdictions that are not parties
to a double taxation agreement sometimes enter into a stand-alone Tax Information
Exchange Agreement. But these agreements have been spectacularly ineffective in
preventing international tax evasion. 10 Often, they apply only to interest earned by
individuals and in order to obtain information from another country pursuant to
these agreements the requesting tax administration has to have reasonable grounds
10 See generally Lee Sheppard, 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Part 4: Ineffectual Information Sharing'
(2009) 122(12) Tax Notes 1411.
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for suspecting that a specified person has evaded taxes, has to identify the person
under examination or investigation, the information sought, the tax purpose for
which it is sought, and the grounds for believing that the information requested is
held within the jurisdiction of which the request is made. Given the ineffectiveness of
these agreements, it is not surprising that offshore banking that caters to tax evaders
has ballooned. This system of offshore financial sector secrecy has contributed to
the recent financial crisis by increasing the volume of funds available for financial
speculation and by reducing the confidence in the stability of the financial sector, in
part, because of the complexity and opacity of these financial arrangements.
What is required, if international tax evasion is to be stemmed, is a requirement
that most payers, including most importantly financial institutions, who have to file
information returns with their domestic tax departments when they make a payment
to a resident taxpayers also have to file information returns with the relevant foreign
tax departments when they make payments to nonresidents." This requirement
should apply to every financial institution or business entity making any payment,
whether income from capital of any form or income for services, to any nonresident
person, whether an individual or a legal entity or a trust. It should include an obligation
to determine the true beneficial owner of the payment. It should be automatic, in
electronic form, and in an agreed-upon language. Secrecy laws, including bank
secrecy laws, should be prohibited from applying to these information returns. Most
importantly, in order to be effective, it must include a unique identification number
for the recipient. Presumably, this would include a code identifying the country in
which the payees were resident taxpayers and their domestic tax number. In a world
in which everyone who travels internationally must carry a passport, which provides
their country of citizenship and a unique identification number, that is routinely
swiped into a computer at every border crossing and can instantly disclose relevant
information relating to that person, this would be easy to accomplish technically.
Would a world tax organization facilitate international agreement on these
types of information exchanges? It is hard to imagine. The sticking point on these
agreements is not the lack of a forum for reaching agreement but instead the political
will. The EU' 2 and the OECD13 have done considerable work and produced directives
and working papers on multilateral, automatic information exchanges but have not
yet recommended the implementation of the kind of comprehensive agreement that
is needed.
11 See Tax Justice Network, 'Tax Information Exchange Arrangements' Tax Justice Briefing (May
2009).
12 The EU adopted a saving tax directive in 2003 after over a decade of debate. For a discussion of
recent proposed amendments see Christiana Panayi, 'The Proposed Amendments to the Savings
Directive' (2009) 49(4) European Taxation 179.
13 See OECD, Manual on the Implementation of Exchange of Information Provisions for Tax
Purposes: Module 3 on Automatic (or Routine) Exchange of Information (Paris: OECD, 2006).
For an review of the implementation of the OECD's principles of transparency and information
exchange for tax purposes see OECD, Tax Co-operation: Towards A Level Playing Field - 2008
Assessment by the Global Forum on Taxation (Paris: OECD, 2008).
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3.6 Controlling Tax Competition
Finally, in addition to stemming tax evasion, an equally important reason for
international tax cooperation is to reign in tax competition between countries.
Tax competition results when governments use their tax systems strategically to
attract financial capital, enterprises, direct investment, or wealthy and highly skilled
individuals. Although the competition might take place with respect to any tax base,
the debilitating effect of this type of tax competition can be illustrated with respect to
corporate tax. Corporate tax competition might take any one of a number of forms
such as special tax holidays, tax concessions, accelerated depreciation allowances,
investment tax credits or lower corporate tax rates generally.
Writing on tax competition has become a cottage industry among tax policy wonks
from all disciplines and there is nothing new to be said about it.14 Nevertheless, since
coordinating corporate tax systems will be the most challenging task for international
cooperation over the next few years, and since Sawyer did not review this aspect
of tax coordination, I will briefly set out here why it is so important. Corporate tax
competition results in a misallocation of resources, a loss of tax revenue, a reduced
ability to use the corporate tax to control corporate power, a reduction in the fairness
and progressivity of tax systems, and increased distortions in labour markets.
In order to achieve the most efficient worldwide allocation of resources,
corporations should invest where production can be carried out at the least cost.
To the extent that corporations shift their production to countries solely in order to
take advantage of reduced taxes, resources will be misallocated. Corporations might
be producing in a country even though costs might be lower in another country.
Worldwide prosperity will be diminished.
Corporate taxes have been important sources of revenues in many countries,
particularly low-income countries. If the corporate tax has to be reduced in response
to tax competition this revenue source will be reduced and, practicably and politically,
it might be difficult to recover this lost revenue through other taxes. Thus, tax
competition means that countries will be able to provide fewer public services than
citizens might otherwise prefer.
In addition to raising revenue, the corporate tax has historically been used by
governments to restrain corporate power. Tax competition reduces the effectiveness
of this important policy instrument over the political power of corporations. Further,
14 Although the literature is so vast that any citation will appear to be randomly selected two
recent reviews by political scientists have provided a somewhat new approach to the issue,
see J.C. Sharman, Havens in a Storm: The Struggle for Global Tax Regulation (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2006) (in its harmful tax competition initiative against tax havens, the
OECD was outflanked rhetorically in part because it was trying to impose standards on tax
havens that it was unwilling to impose on its own members); and Thomas Rixen, The Political
Economy of International Tax Governance (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) (argues, from
the perspectives of a political scientist, that the present international tax regime will remain
inherently unstable unless fundamental reform, such as unitary taxation with formulary
apportionment, is undertaken).
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since it is primarily large multinational corporations that benefit from tax competition,
remaining taxes on corporations are likely to be shifted to smaller less mobile national
corporations.
The reduction in statutory corporate tax rates due to tax competition reduces the
fairness and progressivity of the overall tax system in two ways. First, to attempt to
recoup the lost revenues, governments will be forced to shift the tax base to relatively
immobile bases such as consumption and payroll taxes. These taxes tend to fall
primarily on labour income and hence are much more regressive than taxes on income
from capital.' 5 Second, if the corporate tax rate is much lower than the top personal
tax rate high-income individuals generally will be able to shelter their income from
the top rate by arranging to receive it as corporate-source income. Hence, in most
countries top personal rates have declined in line with the reduction in the corporate
tax rate, making it more difficult for countries to use the tax system to achieve their
distributional goals.
Finally, reducing taxes on income from capital and increasing it on income from
labour increases the labour tax wedge and reduces the level of employment.
There is a huge debate in the tax literature about the extent to which countries
engage in tax competition, whether other countries respond to tax competition, and
if they do so whether such competition is harmful. In particular, skeptics point to
the substantial amounts of tax revenue still collected by modern welfare states as
evidence that tax competition has not had a serious effect on their ability to raise the
amount of revenue desired by their citizens and have made a number of arguments
that even if it has had some effect, tax competition is a good thing: it restrains the size
of government; it puts pressure on governments to deliver public goods and services
more efficiently; and, even if countries have different levels of taxes and public goods,
for whatever reason, individuals will simply move to the jurisdiction that best reflects
their preferences. None of these arguments in support of tax competition make any
sense. What democracy entails, presumably, is that citizens of particular countries
should be able to choose the amount of goods and services they would like delivered
publicly through democratically elected institutions without being pressured by the
deliberate, beggar-thy-neighbour actions of other countries. Although competition
ensures that private firms deliver the goods demanded by consumers as efficiently
as possible, competition between nations that brings pressure to bear on taxes might
simply result in less goods and services than those preferred by the majority of citizens.
15 It is sometimes argued that reduced corporate taxes as a result of tax competition does not
shift the tax burden to labour since the corporate tax itself does not fall on owners of capital
but falls on labour and it is more efficient to simply tax labour directly. However, among other
assumptions, this argument assumes that corporations have the option of avoiding the corporate
tax imposed by a country by employing their capital in jurisdictions with lower corporate taxes.
Thus if a country has high corporate taxes corporations will be able to demand a greater pre-
tax rate of return on investment and hence there will be less capital employed in the country
per worker, and hence lower productivity and lower wages. But the whole point of attempting
to prevent tax competition is to reduce the opportunities for corporations to invest in low-tax
countries.
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One of the most frequently expressed arguments in support of tax competition
is based upon a hypothesis expounded by Charles Tiebout in a 1956 article that has
become a classic in local government finance.16 What has become known as the
Tiebout hypothesis suggests that society's overall welfare will be enhanced if local
governments offer a variety of levels of public goods, and hence have a variety of tax
levels, so that individuals can move to those jurisdictions that reflect their preferences
for public good and taxes. Hence any effort to harmonize taxes will reduce the options
available to individuals in terms of their desired level of public services and will
reduce society's overall welfare. As countless critics have noted, there are a number
of obvious problems with this hypothesis particularly as it applies to countries and
not small local governments. First, the rationale does not apply to legal entities, but
only individuals. Yet international tax competition is often aimed at corporations and
other legal entities. Second, it assumes that individuals are free to move to whatever
jurisdiction might best reflect their tax-expenditure preference. Yet, for a host of
reasons - legal, cost, personal relationships, language barriers - the great majority of
individuals are not free to change their country of residence. Third, it assumes that the
cost of public services provided in a country is reflected in its tax rates, that is to say, the
hypothesis assumes that the only purpose of taxes is to finance the provision of public
goods and services. Yet, taxes and transfers are also used to achieve redistributive
purposes. Fourth, it assumes that all jurisdictions are completely self-contained and
that the level of taxes and benefits provided in one country has no affect on citizens in
other countries. Yet the public services provided in one country - the level of police
and health protection, for example - clearly affect well-being in other countries.
Given the widely accepted premise that tax competition adversely affects world-
wide social welfare, regional and international organizations have used a variety of
policy instruments to attempt to curtail it. Nondiscrimination clauses and prohibition
on state aids in tax treaties and other supernational documents have been used with
some success against the most egregious types of tax competition. Over the past decade,
the EU, the OECD and the UN have all taken various initiatives against harmful tax
competition including suggesting codes of conduct for business taxation that define
tax competition, set out criteria to determine whether it is harmful, and provide for
an array of measures to try to persuade recalcitrant jurisdictions to comply with the
code. These reports have generated an enormous amount of controversy, an extensive
literature, and there is an ongoing debate over how successful they have been.
However, much more significant than standards of conduct for fair tax competition,
a number of commentators have contended that the problem of international
tax avoidance and competition will only be solved if the major countries agree to
adopt some form of combined reporting and formulary apportionment for taxing
multinationals. At present, the income of multinationals is allocated to the various
countries in which they do business on the basis of the principle of separate entity
accounting. The business conducted in each separate country by a multinational is
treated as if it were a completely independent business entity and all the goods and
16 Charles Tiebout, 'A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures' (1956) 64(5) The Journal of Political
Economy 416.
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services that are transferred between such assumed independent business entities in
the various countries in which the multinational does business are priced as if they
had been transferred between unrelated corporations (the so-called arm's-length
method). On this basis, the profits of the multinational are allocated to each country.
There are huge problems with this method of allocating the profits of multinationals:
most notably, in the context of corporate tax competition, since it is relatively easy for
multinationals to manipulate the prices charged for transfers of goods and services
between particular parts of their business located in different countries they can
arrange to report a disproportionate amount of their profits in low-tax jurisdictions
thus providing a powerful incentive for countries to engage in tax competition.' 7
Under a system of combined reporting with formulary apportionment, basically
all the members of a related group of corporations that engage in a common
enterprise must calculate their income as if they were a single taxpayer. Then that
combined income is allocated to the individual countries in which the related group
carries on business based upon a formula that might take into account various factors
such as the group's percentage of sales, assets and payroll in each country. There are
a number of advantages of such a system for calculating and allocating the profits
of multinationals worldwide, but in particular, it greatly reduces opportunities for
tax avoidance and the incentives for tax competition. Of course it would require
an extraordinary degree of international cooperation.' 8 All participating countries
would have to agree on a harmonized corporate tax base (a definition of income) and
on a formula for apportioning the income among countries.
4 A World Tax Organization or a Revitalized Role for
the UN
The point of this somewhat extended discussion of the need for comprehensive
and automatic information reporting, and for combined reporting with formulary
apportionment, is not to debate the merits of these proposals, but simply to suggest
that they are the two important reasons why there needs to be international
17 For particularly good discussions of this and many other problems with the separate accounting
method of allocating the profits of multinationals, and the case for combined reporting with
formulary apportionment, see Michael J. McIntyre, "The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-
States," in Arnold, Sasseville, & Zolt, eds., The Taxation of Business Profits Under Tax Treaties
(2003), ch. 8; Kimberly A. Clausing & Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, "Reforming Corporate Taxation
in a Global Economy: a Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment," Discussion Paper, The
Hamilton Project (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2007).
18 For the past several years the EU has been studying the design and implementation of a common
consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB). There is a significant amount of support for the plan,
but a number of countries have expressed reservations about it. Aside from concerns over the
loss of the ability to use the corporate tax base as an instrument of national public policy, one
of the major sticking points is whether to be effective it would have to be supplemented with
the introduction of a minimum tax rate and how broadly it would have to apply to all forms of
enterprises.
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cooperation in tax matters. I am not sure that Sawyer would dispute this assessment.
His book deals at length with the coordination issues involved in cross border advance
rulings and advance pricing agreements only because he argues that should be the
initial jurisdiction assumed by a world tax organization; however, he does express
reservations about harmonization, which both of these initiatives would entail.
Nevertheless, in thinking about whether there is a need for a world tax organization
the question that should be asked is whether it would be helpful in achieving these
ends or are they more likely to be achieved by concentrated on strengthening existing
international organizations and in particular the UN?
Perhaps in the truly long-run, in a world that at this point is hard to imagine,
there should be a stand-alone world tax organization where all of the issues relating to
international tax could be politicized, debated, and fairly resolved, but in the meantime,
energies would be better spent attempting to increase the capacity, responsiveness,
and transparency of existing international organizations in solving the problems of
tax evasion and international tax competition. Considerable progress has been made,
and much more can be made, through a process of monitoring, negotiating, informal
initiatives, recognition of mutual advantage, and a variety of soft law initiatives.' 9 There
would appear to be considerable value in pursuing these objectives through forums
of different size, membership, interests, methods of proceeding and perspectives. 20
Naturally, pressure should continue to be placed on these organizations, particularly
the OECD, to make them more representative and transparent.
But most importantly, to ensure a more balanced international dialogue about the
need for tax cooperation, the role of the UN should be considerably strengthened.
It should strive to become an equal partner with the OECD in this area. Greater
involvement by the UN would be more likely to result in the questioning of existing
fundamental principles of international tax, like transfer pricing and separate
entity accounting. In order to increase its role the UN's tax policy body should
change its orientation, increase its status (perhaps from an expert committee to an
intergovernmental commission), substantially strengthen its expertise, and greatly
increase the funding and resources it devotes to this issue. The UN should turn its
attention from the details of its model double taxation agreement and focus more
directly on the issues of tax evasion (problems of capital flight) and tax competition
and push for truly global solutions such as automatic information exchanges and the
unitary approach for the taxation of transnational corporations.
19 In this respect I agree with Arthur Cockfield in his article, 'The Rise of the OECD as Informal
'World Tax Organization' Through National Responses to E-Commerce Tax Challenges' (2006)
Yale Journal of Law & Technology Vol 8, in which he documents the success of the OECD in
using these strategies when dealing with the challenges to the international tax regime posed by
the emergence of e-commerce. He concludes that the informal approach used by the OECD is
more likely to be successful with these kinds of issues than a more formal approach that might
be used by a world tax organization. On the two issues I have identified, however, it is the UN
not the OECD that should take the lead
20 See generally Diane Ring, 'International Tax Relations: Theory and Practice' (2007) 60 Tax Law
Review 83.
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The major advantage of strengthening the UN's role is that it would ensure that
the interests and unique problems of low-income countries are given consideration in
the international tax debate and that development issues become more central in that
discussion. The lack of international cooperation has been particularly devastating
to low-income countries. 2' An important debate that really started in March 2002
at the United Nation's International Conference on Financing for Development in
Monterrey Mexico, calls upon low-income countries to mobilize domestic resources
for development and become less dependent on foreign aid.22 This necessity has been
reaffirmed many times since in different international settings.
Although low-income countries confront a daunting array of obstacles to raising
revenue sufficient to fund desperately needed public goods and services, international
tax avoidance and evasion has recently been singled out by a number of international
organizations as being one of the most significant. Much of this revenue loss to
developing countries is due to tax evasion by resident wealthy individuals and to
multinationals shifting profits earned in low-income countries to other countries
with lower taxes. By one estimate, wealthy individuals in low-income countries
have deposited over US$6.2 trillion of income producing assets in jurisdictions
where it is not taxed and where its existence is protected by bank secrecy laws; the
resulting revenue loss to developing countries is estimated to be as high as US$124
billion a year.23 The annual revenue loss to developing countries that arises from the
manipulation of transfer pricing by multinationals has been estimated to be about
$160 billion a year.24 Furthermore, tax holidays and other forms of tax incentives
for active investment are widespread among low-income countries as multinationals
21 A number of articles and studies have been written recently on the damaging effects of tax havens
and capital flight on developing countries and development policy. See, for example, Norway,
Government Commission on Capital Flight Poor Countries, Tax Havens and Development:
Status, Analyses and Measures (Minister of Environment and International Development, 18
June 2009).
22 The so-called Monterrey Consensus embraces a number of areas and has become the major
reference point for international development cooperation. See United Nations, Monterrey
Consensus for Financing For Development (New York, 2003). A follow-up conference, to review
the implementation of the Monterrey Consensus, was held in Doha, Qatar in late November,
early December, 2008. The conference website is at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/doha/
23 This is the conclusion of an analysis done by James Henry, former Chief economist at McKinsey
& Co. Oxfam International, 'Tax haven crackdown could deliver $120 bn a year to fight poverty'
Press Release, 13 March 2009. The Tax Justice Network has estimated that the total stock of
private wealth held by individuals in offshore and onshore tax havens, and undeclared in the
country of residence, at about US$11.5 trillion and the resulting revenue loss at about US$255
million per year. 'The Price of Offshore' Tax Justice Network Briefing Paper (2005).
24 Christian Aid, Death and Taxes: The True Toll of Tax Dodging (May, 2008); see also False Profits:
Robbing the Poor to Keep the Rich Tax-Free (March, 2009). Naturally, these and other figures
of this magnitude have been disputed, see Clemens Fuest and Nadine Riedel, 'Tax evasion,
tax avoidance and tax expenditures in developing countries: A review of the literature' Report
prepared for the UK Department of International Development (DFID), 19 June 2009 ("Overall,
it is fair to concluded that most existing estimates of tax revenue losses in developing countries
due to evasion and avoidance are not based o reliable methods and data" (p. 56).). The authors
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play one low-income country off against others in pushing for lower taxes. Most
low-income countries feel that they have little choice but to offer ever more generous
investment incentives in response to those offered by neighbouring countries.
5 Read This Book
The last part of this review might appear to have wandered away from Sawyer's
book. However, in numerous places in his book and writings Sawyer expresses grave
concern about the ability of nation states to retain their sovereignty unless there is
more international tax cooperation. In chapter 2, he concludes his survey of articles
on the challenges posed by globalization to taxation with this strong statement: "The
discussion makes it clear that the impact of globalization on tax policy and practices
represents the greatest threat to existing tax principles and the tax base since the
end of the second world war, and requires collective action by revenue authorities
to secure the tax bases and prevent a 'race to the bottom' for the lowest tax rates,
thereby severely threatening existing world welfare" (p. 27) Although his book deals
primarily with the need to engage in international tax cooperation in order to reduce
the transaction costs of cross-border business transactions, this brief review of the
other, arguably much more important reasons for international cooperation, is meant
to underline the importance of the general subject with which his book deals.
Developing a World Tax Organization: The Way Forward is a tour de force. It
makes an important contribution to one of the most significant on-going debates
in international tax, although I remain unconvinced about Sawyer's case for the
need for a world tax organization as a way of furthering international cooperation.
Over the past year or so there does appear to be a sea change in the political will to
finally tackle international tax evasion and tax competition. 25 Governments of even
the richest countries appear to have recognized that they must gain some control
over the unrestrained forces of globalization if they are to retain their sovereignty
to pursue the collective aspirations of their citizens, that in an inter-related world
harmonizing certain aspects of tax policy is a necessary precondition to national tax
sovereignty, and that begger-thy-neighbour tax policies are immoral and ultimately
self-destructive. Adrian Saywer's book is essential reading in furthering this debate
and hopefully in his scholarship he will continue to build upon it.
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detailed critique of the review see the Tax Justice Network blog, 'Time to bury the Oxford report',
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25 For an exhaustive review of the activities being undertaken by a broad range of international
organizations in combating international tax evasion and a call for increased action in the
light of the recent economic crises see David Spencer, 'Liechtenstein and the Subprime Crisis:
Systemic Issues in the International Financial and Taxation System' (2008) 14 New Zealand
Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 501.
